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I. Introduction
A long-standing hallmark of the scholarship of Lyman
Johnson and David Millon—both individually and as
co-authors—has been their consistent focus on the social
embeddedness of corporate law generally, and fiduciary duties in
particular. By this I refer to their recognition that corporate law
and fiduciary duties are deeply rooted in a complex of frameworks
and institutions—legal, economic, institutional, professional,
political, social, cultural, and moral—all of which impact one
another collectively, and affect how people concretely behave and
relate to one another in the marketplace.
There are several ways in which this recognition has
manifested itself in their work on corporate fiduciary duties.
Consistent with the traditional emphasis on how robust and
affirmative fiduciary duties sustain the corporate form—both as a
* William Donald Bain Family Professor of Corporate Law and Director,
Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee University. For helpful
suggestions and comments, thanks to Andrew Gold.
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means of establishing and preserving the trust and confidence
that are vital to virtually any business organization, and by
protecting vulnerable parties—Johnson and Millon have long
remained quite critical of the contractual conception of the
business corporation and the narrow focus on shareholders’
interests often associated with this theoretical orientation.1
Stated in fiduciary terminology, the issue of corporate purpose
boils down to the question: “loyalty to whom?”2 In response to
that question, Johnson and Millon have long argued for a more
embracing conception of corporate purpose and fiduciary loyalty
that preserves some capacity for corporate decision-makers to
show regard for the interests of others—be they employees,
creditors, commercial counterparties, local communities, or
society in general. Recognition of the social embeddedness of
corporate law and fiduciary duties likewise animates their
holistic exploration of a wide range of actors—both private and
public—who all collectively impact how these duties are
understood and how fiduciaries actually behave.
This relatively embracing perspective permits us to speak
coherently of a “fiduciary enterprise” that is much broader than
corporate directors and officers. I use the word “enterprise” in the
sense of a broad collective undertaking,3 including the legal,
economic, institutional, professional, political, social, cultural,
and moral frameworks that collectively articulate, translate, and
enforce fiduciary norms and rules in various settings. In Johnson
and Millon’s work, this has most prominently taken the form of a
comprehensive exploration of a much wider range of relevant
1. See infra note 36–38 (describing their recognition as prominent
proponents of a broader conception of corporate purpose).
2. See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 284 (5th ed. 2016) (styling the
issue of corporate purpose as amounting to the question, “[t]o whom do directors
owe loyalty?”). Note, however, that in certain circumstances loyalty could be
said to be owed to an abstract purpose, and that certain theories of business
corporations are arguably amenable to such characterization. See Paul B. Miller
& Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 523–27,
537–39 (2015).
3. See Enterprise n., 1.a, 3. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE
(including “an undertaking” or “[t]he action of taking in hand; management,
superintendence”).
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actors, all of whom play important roles in the articulation of
these duties and their translation into concrete behaviors in
corporate life, and all of whom ought to be held accountable for
their impacts (if only indirectly in some instances, through
recognition of their impacts).
This contribution to a symposium edition of the Washington
and Lee Law Review, honoring Johnson and Millon’s
contributions to the field of corporate law, briefly sketches the
contours of this broader “fiduciary enterprise” of corporate law
and governance and identifies some of the underlying lessons and
challenges that this perspective reveals—for scholars,
practitioners, lawmakers, and judges alike. With respect to the
institutional dimensions of fiduciary law and the equitable
framework and orientation of corporate law, this Article places
greater emphasis on some of Johnson’s recent work. With respect
to corporate purpose, then, and how various legal and market
forces impact the way we conceptualize the legitimate aims of
corporate decision-making, this Article places greater emphasis
on some of Millon’s recent work. It should be borne in mind,
however, that there is nothing inevitable about these choices;
while I believe that these respective contributions illuminate the
fiduciary enterprise of corporate law in peculiarly powerful ways,
both Johnson and Millon have each written on these various
subjects throughout their careers.
II. Fiduciary Duties and Corporate Law’s Fiduciary Enterprise
When we speak in holistic terms of corporate law reflecting
and depending upon a broader “fiduciary enterprise,” who are we
talking about, specifically? Some of the relevant actors are
straightforwardly associated with this topic, while others are less
obviously so. Clearly the fiduciary enterprise of corporate law
must begin with the board of directors who, according to the
Delaware Supreme Court’s archetypal statement in its 1939 Guth
v. Loft, Inc.4 opinion, are “technically not trustees,” yet are said to
“stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its
4.

5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
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stockholders,”
requiring
that
they
“not
only
affirmatively . . . protect the interests of the corporation,” but also
“refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the
corporation.”5 The court’s formulation in Guth clearly reflects the
traditional aim of insulating “trust and confidence” against the
abuse of discretionary power,6 and suggests both a negative and
affirmative thrust to the duty of loyalty—not merely avoiding
conflicts of interest and clear abuses of their authority, but also
affirmatively pursuing the corporation’s best interests, a point
that Johnson has emphasized of fiduciary duties generally.7 This
formulation is also noteworthy for its open-ended nature. The
duty of loyalty described in Guth is said to be owed to “the
corporation and its stockholders” simultaneously (creating an
ambiguity regarding ultimate aims to which we will return to
shortly), and the “occasions” for its application are recognized to
be “many and varied,” defying any “hard and fast rule”—
presumably reflecting the “profound knowledge of human
characteristics and motives” that the court identifies as
prompting its creation.8
In addition to the board of directors, the fiduciary enterprise
also straightforwardly includes the remaining categories of actors
widely understood to occupy fiduciary roles in the corporation.
While shareholders generally are not fiduciaries, a shareholder
who “owns a majority interest in or exercises control over the
business affairs of the corporation” will indeed owe fiduciary
duties to the corporation and the minority shareholders.9 This
5. Id. at 510.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse
in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 27, 38–41, 61–72 (2003) (advocating the
concept of “due loyalty” to underscore “the affirmative thrust of loyalty”). For an
argument that the “good faith” concept, as employed in corporate law, effectively
represents an affirmative aspect of the duty of loyalty, see generally Christopher
M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director
Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131 (2006); see also
Andrew S. Gold, Purposive Loyalty, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 881 (2017) (building
on Johnson’s argument, while distinguishing between advancing a corporation’s
“purposes” and advancing that corporation’s “best interests”).
8. Guth, 5 A.2d at 510.
9. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del.
1987).
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generally becomes significant in conflict transactions and sales of
control, and the source of this duty generally builds upon the
foregoing logic, in so far as fiduciary obligations are effectively
imposed on the party who can actually exert discretionary control
over the corporation’s business and affairs.10
Officers, on the other hand, may occupy a different sort of
fiduciary posture. The Guth formulation of fiduciary loyalty
applied by its terms to officers as well,11 to be sure, but Johnson
and Millon have together argued that the basis for applying
fiduciary duties to officers is their status as agents.12 This is an
underappreciated point that has important implications because
it suggests, as they argue in a co-authored article, that “courts
can and should scrutinize officer conduct more closely than they
now review director performance.”13
In sketching out the reach and consequences of fiduciary
duties in the corporate governance context, the survey of relevant
actors often stops here, with the parties to whom such duties
apply. But Johnson and Millon have shown no inclination to let
the rest of us off the hook so easily. So in this broadly conceived
fiduciary enterprise of corporate law, who are the other actors
who, individually and collectively, imbue fiduciary concepts with
content and condition how the foregoing corporate actors actually
understand and apply those concepts? Phrasing the matter in
10. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719 (Del. 1971)
(“Sinclair nominates all members of Sinven’s board of directors. The Chancellor
found . . . that the directors were not independent of Sinclair. Almost without
exception, they were officers, directors, or employees of corporations in the
Sinclair complex. By reason of Sinclair’s domination . . . Sinclair owed Sinven a
fiduciary duty.”); see also ROBERT A. RAGAZZO & FRANCES S. FENDLER, CLOSELY
HELD BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 548–49 (2d ed.
2012).
11. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“Corporate officers
and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to
further their private interests. While technically not trustees, they stand in a
fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders.”).
12. See generally Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why
Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005).
13. Id. at 1603. For an in-depth discussion of Johnson and Millon’s
argument regarding officers’ fiduciary duties flowing from their status as
corporate agents, see Deborah A. DeMott, Corporate Officers as Agents, 74
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 847 (2017).

796

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 791 (2017)

this way, one might be tempted to jump straight to public
officials, and public actors do in fact loom large (as discussed
below).14 However, there are others who, although less obvious,
are nevertheless highly consequential in conditioning how
various categories of actors understand and deploy fiduciary
concepts—corporate law professors. As Johnson emphasized in a
provocative 2002 article titled The Social Responsibility of
Corporate Law Professors, business people are advised by
corporate lawyers and “[t]he people who introduce them to the
language of corporate law are law professors.”15 This leads
Johnson to ask, quite fairly, whether the academy itself has done
enough to give students a thorough and textured understanding
of concepts like “care,” “loyalty,” and “good faith” in their
“significant social, literary, and moral meaning outside corporate
law discourse,” or whether corporate law professors have
pedagogically defaulted to an atomistic, bargain-based,
contractarian conception of corporate relations,16 effectively
sowing the seeds for future corporate policies and behaviors that
many in the academy profess to disfavor.17 As Johnson sums it up
in another article on the subject, “[w]rongheaded ideas picked up
in law school can critically shape how lawyers discharge their allimportant role as legal counselors to business people.”18
14. See infra notes 19–34 and accompanying text (discussing the respective
roles of Delaware’s legislature and judiciary).
15. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The Social Responsibility of Corporate Law
Professors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1483, 1493 (2002).
16. Id. at 1490.
17. See id. at 1487–90 (“How can we expect [students] to have, or reflect on
whether they might desire, an alternative conception of corporate relations if we
do not provide any?”).
18. Lyman Johnson, Corporate Law Professors as Gatekeepers, 6 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 447, 447 (2009); see also David Millon, Shareholder Primacy in the
Classroom After the Financial Crisis, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 191, 193–95 (2013):
Given the widespread endorsement of the shareholder primacy idea
in the academic and business arenas, it seems to me important that
we law teachers do what we can to disabuse students of the
assumption that corporate law requires that corporate activity
prioritize shareholder interests. . . . One way to do this is to point out
in the business organizations courses the fallacy of the view that
shareholder primacy is a legal doctrine. . . . As corporate law
teachers, our powers are limited but we can at least do our best to
avoid perpetuating facile assumptions about shareholder primacy.
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These foundational dynamics perhaps loom even larger with
those who go on to practice in Delaware—not merely due to
Delaware’s significance in corporate law,19 but also because of the
direct role that the practicing bar plays in drafting Delaware’s
corporate statute, the Delaware General Corporation Law
(DGCL). As one Delaware corporate lawyer has described it, the
DGCL “is the great beneficiary of an unwritten compact between
the bar and the state legislature,” under which “the legislature
will call upon the expertise of the Corporation Law Section of the
Delaware Bar Association to recommend, review, and draft
almost all amendments to the statute.”20
At the same time, then, the training of Delaware’s lawyers
will naturally affect their inputs into the judicial process, in the
form of the arguments that they develop and present to
Delaware’s courts.21 And this, of course, is where the rubber truly
meets the road in terms of the development of corporate fiduciary
duties—the Delaware Court of Chancery. Many who do not study
or practice corporate law are surprised to learn that corporate
litigation in Delaware is heard in a true court of equity22—and
here we can begin to perceive the more concrete institutional
dimensions of the fiduciary enterprise of corporate law. Under
Delaware’s constitution, the Court of Chancery has general
equity jurisdiction that (in the Supreme Court’s words) “is
defined as all the general equity jurisdiction of the High Court of
Chancery of Great Britain as it existed prior to the separation of
19. See About Agency, DELAWARE DEP’T ST., DIVISION CORPS.,
http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited May 2, 2017)
(“The State of Delaware is a leading domicile for U.S. and international
corporations. More than 1,000,000 business entities have made Delaware their
legal home. More than 66% of all publicly-traded companies in the United
States including 66% of the Fortune 500 have chosen Delaware as their legal
home.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
20. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 4 (2007).
21. Cf. id. at 1, 5–6 (observing that “Delaware cases are studied in almost
every corporations course” in the United States and describing the experience of
“out-of-town lawyers making their first appearance in Chancery”).
22. See Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, DELAWARE COURTS,
http://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/jurisdiction.aspx (last visited May 2, 2017)
(explaining that the “Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to hear and determine
all matters and causes in equity”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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the colonies,” generally keyed to the 1792 vesting of authority in
the court, to the extent that there is no adequate remedy at law.23
As Johnson has emphasized, “[a] key creation of judge-made
equity is the concept of fiduciary duties,” and on both conceptual
levels—equity writ large, and fiduciary duties in particular—
Delaware corporate law, and the Court of Chancery itself, are
accordingly rooted in very deep legal, intellectual, and moral
traditions. 24
Aristotle himself observed the core problem that “all law is
universal but about some things it is not possible to make a
universal statement which shall be correct”—prompting the
emergence of equity as a corrective.25 “When the law speaks
universally, then, and a case arises which is not covered by the
universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us
and has erred by over-simplicity, to correct the omission. . . . And
this is the nature of the equitable.”26 Legal historians might
immediately perceive resonances in old English decisions such as
The Earl of Oxford’s Case,27 where Lord Chancellor Ellesmere
declared in 1615 that “[t]he Cause why there is a Chancery is, for
that Mens Actions are so divers and infinite, That it is impossible
to make any general Law which may aptly meet with every
particular Act”—the Chancellor’s role, then, being “to correct
Mens Consciences for Frauds, Breach of Trusts, Wrongs and
Oppressions, of what Nature soever they be.”28 Delaware
corporate lawyers may in turn perceive resonances of the
23. DuPont v. DuPont, 85 A.2d 724, 727–29 (Del. 1951). For additional
background on the history of the Court of Chancery and the scope of its equity
jurisdiction, see Del. Const. art. IV, §§ 10, 17 (2017); BLACK, supra note 20, at 5;
Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 703,
716–18 (2011); William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the
Delaware Court of Chancery—1792–1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 825–30
(1993); Delaware Judiciary, supra note 22.
24. Johnson, supra note 23, at 711.
25. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 133 (David Ross trans., 1980).
26. Id.
27. 21 Eng. Rep. 485 (1615).
28. Id. at 486. For additional background on how the “Aristotelian tradition
of equity” impacted courts of equity, see Henry E. Smith, Equity as SecondOrder Law: The Problem of Opportunism 5–6, 21–22 (Harvard Public Law
Working
Paper
No.
15–13,
2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2617413.
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foregoing in Delaware case law—for example, in Schnell v.
Chris-Craft,29 where the Delaware Supreme Court famously
declared (much closer to the present) that “inequitable action
does not become permissible simply because it is legally
possible.”30
Consistent with Delaware’s rootedness in the long-standing
legal, intellectual, and moral traditions of equity, corporate
fiduciary duties themselves straightforwardly make their way
from England to Delaware via the Court of Chancery’s
constitutional jurisdiction. Fiduciary duties were well recognized
in England as an expression of equity by the eighteenth
century,31 including in the corporate context. As Lord Chancellor
Hardwicke declared in a case involving board oversight failures
and allegations of “a breach of trust, fraud, and mismanagement,”
[n]or will I ever determine that a court of equity cannot lay
hold of every breach of trust, let the person be guilty of it
either in a private, or public capacity. The tribunals of this
kingdom are wisely formed both of courts of law and
equity . . . and for this reason there can be no injury, but
there must be a remedy in all or some of them.32

Accordingly, Delaware’s own Court of Chancery—with
jurisdiction keyed to this institutional framework and body of
29. 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
30. Id. at 439.
31. See Winchester (Bishop of) v. Knight, 24 Eng. Rep. 447, 448 (1717)
(stating that “[i]t would be a reproach to equity, to say, where a man has taken
my property . . . and disposed of it in his life-time, and dies, that in this case, I
must be without a remedy,” and that “it is stronger in this case by reason that
the tenant is a sort of a fiduciary to the lord”).
32. The Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 642, 645 (1742). For
additional background, see Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law is Equitable, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 261, 264 (Andrew S. Gold &
Paul B. Miller eds., 2014); Samuel L. Bray, A Student’s Guide to the Meanings of
“Equity,” OPEN SCIENCE FRAMEWORK (July 20, 2016), https://osf.io/sabev/ (last
visited May 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Johnson, supra note 23, at 709–10; Lyman Johnson, Enduring Equity in the
Close Corporation 23–24 (University of St. Thomas Minnesota School of Law
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10–26, Washington and Lee University
School
of
Law
Legal
Studies
Research
Paper
No.
2010–11),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=1717034; Quillen &
Hanrahan, supra note 23.

800

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 791 (2017)

law—has straightforwardly possessed jurisdiction over corporate
fiduciary duty cases. Indeed, Delaware’s Chancellor Allen,
writing in 1987, explained that the Court of Chancery’s
jurisdiction in such cases flows from the fact that such duties “are
imposed by equity and are recognized and enforced exclusively by
a court of equity.”33 And in the corporate context, those equitable
powers and associated duties have generally trumped contractual
freedom when they directly collide—notably in the courts’
rejection of efforts to contractually “define or limit the directors’
fiduciary duties,” or to “prevent . . . directors from carrying out
their fiduciary duties,” whether at the board’s or the
shareholders’ behest.34
III. Corporate Purpose: Loyalty to Whom?
Consistent with this broad view of the contours of the
fiduciary enterprise as a superstructure for corporate law,
encompassing a wide range of private and public actors
contributing to the life of that enterprise in various ways,
Johnson and Millon have taken a similarly expansive approach to
the issue of corporate purpose—that is, the issue of whose
interests ought to guide corporate decision-making. As noted
above, phrased in fiduciary terminology, the question is
essentially “loyalty to whom?”35—and Johnson and Millon
together have long been recognized as prominent proponents of a
conception of corporate purpose that reaches well beyond the
shareholders alone, affording boards meaningful discretion to
show regard for the interests of non-shareholders in a wide range
33. McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 604 (Del. Ch. 1987).
34. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del.
1994); see also CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227,
238–40 (Del. 2008) (explaining that “[t]his Court has previously invalidated
contracts that would require a board to act or not act” in a manner limiting its
fiduciary duties, and similarly invalidating “a binding bylaw that the
shareholders seek to impose involuntarily on the directors in the specific area of
election expense reimbursement”).
35. See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 2, at 284 (styling the issue of
corporate purpose as amounting to the question, “[t]o whom do directors owe
loyalty?”).
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of circumstances. This approach has loomed largest in their
scholarship on legal responses to hostile takeovers,36 which pit
premium-seeking shareholders diametrically against the stability
interests of employees, creditors, local communities, and of course
management.37 In fact, by the mid-1990s one finds references in
the corporate law literature to “the Washington and Lee School of
corporate
jurisprudence”—characterized
by
a
“brilliant
intellectual history of legal theorizing about the corporation

36. Johnson and Millon made numerous contributions in this area during
the height of the takeover boom in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Co-authored
pieces include Lyman Johnson & David Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 BUS.
LAW. 2105 (1990); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Takeovers and
Corporate Law: Who’s in Control?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1177 (1993); Lyman
Johnson & David Millon, Does the Williams Act Preempt State Common Law in
Hostile Takeovers?, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 339 (1989); Lyman Johnson & David
Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862 (1989); Lyman
Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87
MICH. L. REV. 846 (1989). Individually authored pieces include Lyman Johnson,
Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who Are They For?, 43 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 781 (1986); Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of
Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865 (1990); Lyman Johnson,
The Eventual Clash Between Judicial and Legislative Notions of Target
Management Conduct, 14 J. CORP. L. 35 (1988); Lyman Johnson, Individual and
Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215
(1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) and ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD
SOCIETY (1991)); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Making (Corporate) Law in a Skeptical
World, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161 (1992); Lyman Johnson, Sovereignty Over
Corporate Stock, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 485 (1991); Lyman Johnson, State Takeover
Statutes: Constitutionality, Community, and Heresy, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1051 (1988); David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223
(1991); David Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation Law?, 45
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 903 (1988); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990
DUKE L.J. 201 (1990).
37. See generally CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE
COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER 36–
53 (2013). The core conflict that characterizes hostile takeovers can arise in any
corporate governance system with widely dispersed shareholdings, and
otherwise similar common-law legal systems have addressed this conflict in
differing ways. Id. The U.S. approach shows greater regard for nonshareholders’ interests, a response that I have argued elsewhere reflects the
weakness of the U.S. social safety net and consequent political pressures
brought to bear upon the corporate governance system in the period of perceived
crisis following the advent of hostile takeovers in the 1980s. See generally id.
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and . . . its powerful critique of conservative arguments against
managerial responsiveness to nonshareholder interests.”38
Johnson and Millon arrived in legal academia just as these
developments were starting to re-shape corporate law and
governance in fundamental ways, and they wrote extensively on
these topics for many years, both individually and together.39 To
be sure, there is substantial disagreement across the academy—
even among scholars who normatively favor such views—
regarding whether shareholder-oriented approaches or so-called
“communitarian” or “progressive” approaches better describe the
law, particularly in Delaware.40 For present purposes, however, I
38. William H. Simon, What Difference Does It Make Whether Corporate
Managers Have Public Responsibilities?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1697, 1697
(1993); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 856, 857 (1997) (explaining that “the principal resistance” to
law-and-economics conceptions of the corporation was “currently [being] offered
by a group of relatively young academics loosely centered around the corporate
law faculties of the Washington & Lee and George Washington law schools”).
39. Johnson arrived in 1985 and Millon arrived in 1986. Lyman P.Q.
Johnson, WASH. & LEE SCH. OF L., https://law2.wlu.edu/faculty/profiledetail.asp
?id=23 (last visited May 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review);
David
Millon,
WASH.
&
LEE
SCH.
OF
L.,
http://law2.wlu.edu/faculty/profiledetail.asp?id=33 (last visited Apr. 4, 2017) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
40. Compare, e.g., BRUNER, supra note 37, at 36–65 (arguing that “U.S.
shareholders possess surprisingly limited capacity to intervene in corporate
affairs, and their interests are not prioritized with anything approaching the
clarity and consistency enjoyed by their U.K. counterparts”); LYNN STOUT, THE
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 24–32 (2012) (arguing that “[t]here is no solid legal
support for the claim that directors and executives . . . have an enforceable legal
duty to maximize shareholder wealth”); Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring
Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1408–27 (2008) (arguing
that corporate law is “ambivalent regarding its power constituencies, its
beneficiaries, and its relationship to the social good”); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing
Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 763–76 (2005)
(arguing that “the law has never barred corporations from sacrificing corporate
profits to further public interest goals that are not required by law”); Johnson,
The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law,
supra note 36, at 898–903, 909–17 (describing the tension between
“management discretion and shareholder primacy”); David Millon, Radical
Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1014, 1022–25, 1043–44
(2013) (describing corporate law’s traditional “assignment of broad discretion to
management and its weak commitment to accountability to shareholders”), with
KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND
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remain focused on the expansiveness of Johnson and Millon’s
investigation of the various factors that have fueled the
increasingly widespread perception that corporate law and
governance ought to focus narrowly on the shareholders’
interests. This involves an account not solely of law and
regulation, but also of academia, the market, and society. On this
score I will focus particular on some of Millon’s more recent work
in that vein.
As Johnson and Millon both recognized early on in their
takeover scholarship, there is a core ambiguity in the Guth
formulation of the duty of loyalty, said to be owed to “the
corporation and its stockholders” simultaneously—a formulation
that, as Johnson suggested in a 1990 article, essentially
“bracketed” the debate about whether the corporation is best
conceptualized as an entity, or rather as an aggregation of
individuals.41 This debate did not require doctrinal resolution as a
practical matter for most of the twentieth century due to
widespread prosperity and correlatively limited conflict among
corporate constituencies.42 As Millon likewise observed the same
year, “the interests of the corporation and of its shareholders
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 22 (2006) (arguing that those describing corporate
law as embracing “shareholder supremacy” are, in terms of “pure
description, . . . more right than wrong”); Kent Greenfield, Sticking the Landing:
Making the Most of the ‘Stakeholder Moment,’ 26 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 147, 147–48
(2015) (reporting “significant pushback against the shareholder primacy norm”
while arguing that “accounts of [its] imminent death . . . are exaggerated”); Leo
E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding
of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General
Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 763 (2015) (expressing
sympathy toward “center-left” views while arguing that “stockholder welfare [is]
the sole end of corporate governance” under Delaware law); David G. Yosifon,
The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 228 (2013)
(identifying with “progressive” scholars normatively while arguing that
Delaware law embraces “shareholder primacy”).
41. See Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate
Life and Corporate Law, supra note 36, at 900 n.133 (“Asserting that directors
owe duties to stockholders acknowledges the corporation as an aggregation of
individual actors, and emphasizing duties to the corporation expresses that
corporations are entities separate and distinct from individual participants.”).
42. See id. (“Rather than seek to resolve a theoretical debate that could not
be, and did not need to be, resolved at the doctrinal level . . . pretakeover legal
doctrine in the fiduciary area simply equivocated.”).
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have been assumed to be at least congruent,” but “[s]ince the
advent of hostile takeovers, this assumed identity of interest has
no longer been tenable.”43 In a substantial body of work—some
written individually, and some together—Johnson and Millon
argued forcefully that the legal response to hostile takeovers
revealed a vision of corporate purpose far more expansive than
shareholder interests alone.44 This was most vividly reflected in
anti-takeover statutes, but it was also detectable in Delaware
case law, they argued, where review of takeovers broke strongly
in favor of board discretion to focus on the corporation’s long-term
sustainability, with so-called “Revlon duties”—requiring focus on
maximizing the price received by shareholders—applying only in
a narrow range of final-period scenarios, which themselves would
arise only if the board so decided.45
There is no gainsaying the extraordinary power of
shareholder-centrism as a dominant norm in corporate
governance,46 however, and some of Millon’s recent work has
43. Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note 36, at 255. Hostile
takeovers and the stark divergence of interests revealed by these transactions
vividly reflect corporate law’s ambivalence regarding shareholders. See generally
Bruner, supra note 40, at 1415–18; see also Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 538–
39, 582–83 (characterizing corporate law’s apparent ambivalence as
simultaneous pursuit of loyalty to shareholders and loyalty to abstract
purposes).
44. See supra note 36 (cataloguing their scholarship in this area).
45. Id.; see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955
(Del. 1985) (permitting target boards to assess effects on “the corporate
enterprise,” including “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders”);
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (holding that once “the break-up of the company was inevitable,” the
board’s duty “changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to
the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit”);
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43–44 (Del. 1994)
(applying Revlon duties in the context of “a sale of control”); Paramount
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149–54 (Del. 1990) (“The fiduciary
duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a time frame for
achievement of corporate goals. . . . Directors are not obliged to abandon a
deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless
there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.”).
46. Cf. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 2, at 284–85 (characterizing
“loyalty to equity investors” as “an important theme of U.S. corporate law,”
while adding that “shareholder priority more closely resembles a deep but
implicit value in American corporate law than a legal rule in any normal
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proven particularly illuminating as to its origins and the nature
of its peculiar force. Specifically, Millon has dug deeply into the
range of structures that condition what we expect of various
market actors and impact how they choose to behave. In an
important recent article Millon distinguishes a more “radical”
variant of shareholder primacy that has taken hold over recent
decades, which tends to characterize boards of directors as mere
agents of the shareholders with little legitimate discretion to
focus on the long-term.47 The story of radical shareholder
primacy’s origins proves to be equal parts law, economics (of a
sort), sociology, and cultural history. In addition to charting the
ascendance of the “nexus of contracts” view of the corporation,
rooted in Chicago-school “law and economics,” he traces how
those ideas made their way—again, via the academy, and figures
well positioned to amplify those ideas in the business press—to
those who ultimately counsel corporate managers and major
investors.48 Millon concludes, with considerable justification, that
“[r]adical shareholder primacy in the law schools is probably part
of a larger ideological, economic, and socio-political phenomenon
that now shapes and legitimates business practice in powerful
ways. That complex but hugely important story has yet to be
told.”49
In a similarly holistic manner, Millon has explored various
market constraints driving major institutions—by far the most
consequential actors in today’s capital markets50—to focus
sense”).
47. See Millon, supra note 40, at 1018–21.
48. See generally id. at 1025–42; see also Millon, supra note 18, at 191–92
(describing how shareholder primacy is commonly accepted by legal and
business scholars, as well as “business leaders, investors, politicians, and
government regulators”).
49. Millon, supra note 40, at 1042; see also Millon, supra note 18, at 195
(arguing that students “need to understand that non-legal values and
incentives—including political commitment, social norms, compensation
arrangements, pressure from institutional shareholders, to name a few—can
lead corporate management to prioritize current share price maximization over
long-term strategic investment and cultivation of the well-being of key
nonshareholder constituencies”).
50. See David Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 911, 913 (2013) (observing that institutions “own approximately threefourths of the 1,000 largest U.S. corporations and around 70% of the shares of
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intently on short-term stock price performance, and to pressure
corporate management to do the same. In another recent piece he
dissects the enormous pressures that institutions face to deliver
short-term returns—for example, the fact that “[t]o meet their
current obligations, public pension funds have historically
assumed an annual rate of return of 8%, give or take a half point
depending on the plan.”51 Obviously most public pensions have
not been able to achieve that sort of return following the crisis,
leading them to “focus on short-term stock price performance”
and increasingly depend upon trading strategies involving “high
turnover rates”—realities hardly compatible with the old-school
ideal of patient capital supporting management in the pursuit of
sustainable long-term growth.52 Similar market pressures impact
other types of institutions, and of course legal pressures
emanating from unexpected sources can (ironically) reinforce
these tendencies—including prudent investor standards
applicable to pensions under federal labor law and state law,53
which have been interpreted to require intense focus on
generating returns for beneficiaries and even pro-active
engagement in activism to force management to behave
accordingly.54
IV. Contractualism and the Fiduciary Enterprise
The holistic approaches that Johnson and Millon have taken
in their exploration of the fiduciary superstructure of corporate
law and their related exploration of corporate purpose—including
this wide-ranging discussion of the various pressures toward a
all U.S. corporations”).
51. Id. at 931.
52. Id. at 930–32; see also Millon, supra note 18, at 192 (“Commitment to
short-term shareholder value has significant negative implications for the
long-term viability of large corporations . . . .”).
53. See Millon, supra note 50, at 938–39.
54. For an in-depth examination of pressures toward short-term-oriented
shareholder-centrism emerging from such bodies of law, see generally
Christopher M. Bruner, Center-Left Politics and Corporate Governance: What Is
the “Progressive” Agenda?, 2018 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2917253.
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narrow
focus
on
shareholders—highlight
fundamental
dimensions of the evolving landscape for business organizations
law. This section explores some important lessons and challenges
that this perspective reveals.
Doctrinally, the most significant innovations in this regard
have arisen in the area of unincorporated entities—notably the
advent of limited liability companies (LLCs)—and in this area
Delaware, in particular, has chosen to permit total elimination of
fiduciary duties that would otherwise be owed by those managing
the business.55 In such a case, we are quite literally left with a
purely contractual business arrangement, for which the baseline
standard of conduct is reduced to the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.56 Indeed, the legislative intent to permit a
fundamentally contractual relationship is underscored by an
unequivocal “policy . . . to give maximum effect to the principle of
freedom of contract and to the enforceability of partnership [or
LLC] agreements.”57
It is widely assumed in the literature that contract provides a
clearer conceptual framework for business organizations, and
accordingly ought to be preferred over messy, equitable gapfillers.58 However, the fuller picture of the fiduciary enterprise
55. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2017) (“To the extent that . . . a
member or manager or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to
[an LLC] or to another member or manager . . . the member’s or manager’s or
other person’s duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions
in the [LLC] agreement . . . .”).
56. See id. (providing that “the [LLC] agreement may not eliminate the
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing”).
57. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-103(a), (b)(3), (d), (f) (2017); see also DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(c)-(d), (f) (2017) (expressing the same policy); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b)–(c), (e) (2017) (expressing the same policy). For a
comparative discussion of permissible contractual limitation of fiduciary duties
in the United States and the United Kingdom, see Christopher M. Bruner,
Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities in U.S. and U.K. Business
Entities, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW (Gordon Smith & Andrew
Gold eds., Edward Elgar, forthcoming 2017).
58. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 90 (1991) (“If contracts can be written in enough
detail, there is no need for ‘fiduciary’ duties as well.”); see also Larry E. Ribstein,
Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537,
541–50 (1997) (evaluating how the costs and benefits of fiduciary duties may
vary depending on the circumstances).
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that Johnson and Millon have sketched out for us suggests that
the matter is not so simple as that. The shift from a more
relational conception of governance to a more contractual
conception of governance implicates not just legal rules, but the
entire social and institutional framework that surrounds and
applies fiduciary norms and rules.
Johnson, for example, has argued forcefully that the
constitutional basis of the Delaware Court of Chancery’s equity
jurisdiction literally precludes the legislature from statutorily
barring Chancery judges from scrutinizing fiduciary duty
waivers.59 As he pithily expresses the point, “[t]he judges of the
Chancery Court may rue this discretion, or seek in various ways
to shun it or corral it. What they cannot do is deny they continue
to possess it.”60 Ultimately, Johnson challenges us to think harder
about whether there is a broader wisdom to the constitutional
embeddedness of the Court of Chancery’s equity jurisdiction—for
example, the “scant protection” offered by the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and the consequent dangers facing
unsophisticated parties not plausibly capable of anticipating all
the ways in which they might be abused, let alone negotiating
effective contractual protections.61
Relatedly, we might reasonably query what it means to alter
the Court of Chancery itself, as arguably occurs in an incremental
fashion as a consequence of these same developments. As
discussed above, the Court of Chancery’s jurisdiction over
corporate governance relationships has long been considered a
matter of course, flowing directly as it does from the equitable
59. See generally Johnson, supra note 23.
60. Id. at 720.
61. See id.at 723–24 (“Why try to clumsily retool an untried concept when
one designed specifically for the task at hand—fiduciary duty—already exists?
Moreover, recent decisional law demonstrates that there is little robustness to
the doctrine and that it affords scant protection.”). It has been argued more
generally that equity emerged to provide “a safety valve to deal with the
problem of opportunism that arises where the simple ex ante structures of the
common law invite efforts at manipulation by the sophisticated and
unscrupulous.” See Henry E. Smith, The Equitable Dimension of Contract, 45
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 897, 903–11 (2012); see also generally Smith, supra note 28
(similarly characterizing equity as “second-order law” aimed at responding to
opportunistic behavior).
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roots of fiduciary duties.62 Chancellor Allen, in the opinion quoted
above, explained that this is why “Chancery’s traditional
jurisdiction over corporate officers and directors” has applied
“without regard to the remedy sought.”63 So how, then, do we
conceptualize Chancery’s role in governance-related disputes
arising in the unincorporated entity context where—per the
statutes and the express legislative policy in favor of maximum
freedom of contract—such duties might not even apply? The
general jurisdictional provision of the corporate statute does not
bother to address such matters, presumably because (as
Chancellor Allen’s observation suggests) there is no need to do
so.64 Yet its counterpart in the LLC statute expressly clarifies
that the Court of Chancery can hear actions involving “the duties,
obligations or liabilities” among members and managers65—
presumably reflecting the fact that, if fiduciary duties are
removed from the equation, it is not entirely obvious that the
Court of Chancery has any business here. This suggests, if subtly,
that unincorporated entities heavily leaning on contract as their
organizing principle impact not just the mores of governance
among private actors, but also the larger social and institutional
framework that their relations inhabit.
The larger public impacts of styling unincorporated entities
as solely or primarily contractual in nature are readily apparent
in recent Delaware case law tackling such matters directly. In his
In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC66 opinion in 2015, Vice Chancellor
Laster found that an assignee of an LLC membership interest
had equitable standing to seek dissolution, even though there
was plainly no statutory or contractual right for an assignee to do
62. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (describing how the
Court of Chancery’s jurisdiction over corporate fiduciary duty cases arises from
the court’s equitable jurisdiction).
63. McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 604 (Del. Ch. 1987).
64. Cf. id. (“The duties they owe to shareholders . . . are imposed by equity
and are recognized and enforced exclusively by a court of equity.”).
65. Compare 8 DEL. C. § 111 (2017) (addressing corporations), with 6 DEL.
C. § 18-111 (2017) (addressing LLCs); see also 6 DEL. C. § 15-122 (2017)
(addressing general partnerships); 6 DEL. C. § 17-111 (2017) (addressing limited
partnerships).
66. 114 A.3d 592 (Del. Ch. 2015).
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so.67 Both sides had apparently believed that a transfer of full
membership had been accomplished, and Vice Chancellor Laster’s
response to the argument that Section 18-802 of Delaware’s LLC
act represents “the exclusive extra-contractual method of
dissolving an LLC”68 underscores the degree to which assessing
the extent of the LLC’s inherent contractualism remains bound
up with what Vice Chancellor Laster calls “the ‘complete system’
of equity that [the Chancery] court inherited and administers,”69
and the state’s continuing political and social interest in business
entities that deploy publicly created powers. Vice Chancellor
Laster writes that if the statute had purported to displace the
Court of Chancery’s “traditional equitable jurisdiction” to order
dissolution, that “would raise serious constitutional questions” (a
proposition for which he cites Johnson’s work),70 and further
states that parties’ ability to contractually waive the right to
statutory dissolution “does not extend to a party’s standing to
seek dissolution in equity.”71 He then ties the issue of
contractualism directly to the Court of Chancery’s own status and
role:
To my mind, when a sovereign makes available an entity with
attributes that contracting parties cannot grant themselves by
agreement, the entity is not purely contractual. Because the
entity has taken advantage of benefits that the sovereign has
provided, the sovereign retains an interest in that entity. That
interest in turn calls for preserving the ability of the
sovereign’s courts to oversee and, if necessary, dissolve the
entity. Put more directly, an LLC agreement is not an
exclusively private contract among its members precisely
because the LLC has powers that only the State of Delaware
can confer. . . . Just as LLCs are not purely private entities,
dissolution is not a purely private affair. . . . Because an LLC
takes advantage of benefits that the State of Delaware
provides, and because dissolution is not an exclusively private
matter, the State of Delaware retains an interest in having the

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id. at 592, 594, 597, 601.
Id. at 595–97.
Id. at 602.
Id.
Id. at 605.

THE FIDUCIARY ENTERPRISE OF CORPORATE LAW

811

Court of Chancery available, when equity demands, to hear a
petition to dissolve an LLC. . . .72

Vice Chancellor Laster’s analysis vividly emphasizes the
“complete system” of equity to which he draws attention in the
opinion, and reveals this issue of the LLC’s degree of
contractualism to be inherently bound up with a much larger set
of political, social, and institutional dynamics, involving a high
degree of identity-relevance for the Court of Chancery itself.73
Simply put, the LLC’s degree of contractualism cannot be
assessed in isolation from broader political, social, and
institutional dynamics; the subject is inherently public.
V. Conclusion
The stubborn persistence of equity and fiduciary duties,
notwithstanding the apparent victory of contractualism reflected
in the unincorporated entity statutes, suggests that the law of
business organizations simply cannot be fully specified ex ante.
As Lord Chancellor Ellesmere back in the seventeenth century
might have put it, our “[a]ctions are so divers and infinite”74 that
a flexible, equitable framework becomes unavoidable; we could
dismantle it, but would only end up reinventing it.75 This is a
critical aspect of the progressive response to contractualism—
contractualists
fundamentally
believe
that
governance
arrangements are amenable to a high degree of ex ante
specification, and progressives fundamentally do not.76
72. Id. at 605–06.
73. See id. at 602 (“It is the ‘complete system’ of equity that this court
inherited and administers, not the temporally specific subject matter of
eighteenth century cases.”).
74. The Earl of Oxford’s Case, 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 486 (1615).
75. Cf. Smith, supra note 61, at 903–11 (characterizing equity as an
essential “safety valve” to respond to opportunistic behavior).
76. See, e.g., David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law:
Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 7–9
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (“Skepticism toward contractarian assumptions
about the technological feasibility of adequate self-protection through contract is
an important aspect of the communitarian stance.”). It has been argued more
generally that, in overstating the degree to which risks can be assessed ex ante,
law and economics scholarship effectively “sweeps the problem of the
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There is arguably no more consequential issue in corporate
law and governance than this, and Johnson and Millon’s work
challenges us to tackle it fully and forthrightly, recognizing that
issues of time horizon, corporate purpose, and relational
paradigm are not simply doctrinal questions. These matters
reflect an extraordinarily complex netting of vectors that
emanate not only from various forms of law and regulation, but
also from a host of economic, institutional, professional, political,
social, cultural, and moral inputs that shape norms and attitudes
about how we ought to relate to one another in our economic
lives. To paraphrase Millon’s conclusion cited above, we have
barely begun to tell this “hugely important story,”77 let alone to
grapple with it.

opportunist under the rug” and thereby “assume[s] away the problem equity is
there to solve.” Smith, supra note 28, at 58, 61–62.
77. Cf. Millon, supra note 40, at 1042.

